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LECTURE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW.
International Law, the law governing the relations of civil-
ized states with one another, has been a badly abused science, if,
indeed, it can be called a science.
Some there are who deny to it even the right to be called
law. Law, they say, under the lead of Austin, is a body of rules
imposed upon the bulk of a society by a superior, who is not
himself in turn subject to any superior. Since International
Law has not grown up in this way, in fact, cannot grow in this
way, because there is no superior whether individual or sover-
eignty or court which is in a position to lay down the law and
be listened to, these critics would make of it only a system of
international morality or ethics.
Others give it the name of law, but refuse it that character
-in fact, tend to deprive it of all character-by spinning its
rules out of their own brains, and putting their own ideas of
what should be law, alongside of the rules which have bound
states for generations, on terms of perfect equality.
This sort of animal is apt to be a continental jurist, and is
profoundly contemned by the man bred under the common law
of England and the United States, with a wholesome respect
for precedent and judicial decisions. He in turn may serve his
mistress badly, if he falls back, hide-bound, upon the lessons of
the past, its accepted rules, its unquestioned usages, its century
old laws, with never an attempt to better or amend or replace
what has been outgrown. Formalist, theorist, critical jurist,
each has his value, but to get that value out, you must roll the
three together and mingle their methods, as you rub your salt,
and oil, and vinegar into one smooth resultant.
Thus the Austinian critic is wrong, because he does not
account for the facts in the case; he does not explain the exist-
ence of a body of international rules and usages, by which
states in their intercourse are, and agree to be governed, but
which are far wider and more extensive than the sum of their
treaty agreements.
NoTE.-This attempt to cover in a popular way and in brief space the
entire field of International Law, is printed here for the first time, at the wish
of the Editor, with the hope of making clearer a subject which most lawyers
are too busy to master for themselves.
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So is the theorist wrong, because he sets forth his wishes
and fancies as law and fact. Were his method right, there
could be, and probably would be, as many different bodies of
International Law as there are jurists.
The follower of precedents is on safer ground, but, unless he
infuses a progressive spirit and logical reasoning into his study
of them, these precedents will have no element of growth
within them, and soon become insufficient for complicated
modern use.
Grotins, the patron saint of the International Lawyers, who
published in 16o9 and 1625, though striving to unite these
methods, and though surprisingly correct and useful in many
conclusions, is nevertheless an example of too seriously follow-
ing the examples of past history. Thus he argues, that State A,
in order to wage a just war vs. State B, may march an army
across the territory of State C., though neutral, which separates
them, and in proof cites Moses, Clearchus, Lysander, Cimon,
Agesilaus and Frederick Barbarossa.
Now it happens that this right of military passage to-day
does not exist. Fancy a German army in 1870 marching across
Belgium or Switzerland in order to invade France. It would have
been the grossest violation of neutrality. But how has the
change come about? It has been gradual, and due to the
growth in importance of the neutral interest, i. e. of those who
do not share in a war which their neighbors, two or more, may
be engaged in. Once war was all important and involved all
within reach whether or no. Later it became exceptional and
the neutral principle began to have influence. Now war is
freqfient enough, but its effects are limited just as far as pos-
sible to those actually engaged in it. The neutral interest has
become predominant.
This is a fair illustration of the way in which the law of
nations grows. Precedent is its source, but reason and utility
are the shaping tools.
And here let me emphasize the fact that state policy is an
inherent and important factor in almost every international
rule. The existence of a law may be clear, its justice may be
undoubted, its enforcement nevertheless will depend upon a
dozen considerations, among which the size and strength of the
other party is a chief one.
The other day a German missionary was maltreated in
China. Redress was undoubtedly due. But China yields only
to pressure, and pressure means taking redress into one's own
hands. This Germany was not loath to do, and made that mis-
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sionary worth the cession, under the veil of a lease, of an im-
portant Chinese seaport with a considerable district around it.
Now suppose the missionary incident to have happened in
Japan, would Germany have used the same method? Would
* she have departed from the peaceable diplomatic method of se-
curing redress? Most assuredly not, because Japan is in a
position to give redress, and also, which is more important, to
prevent its being taken. Japan is a sword fish, while China is a
jelly fish. Japan is a homogeneous state, while China is cha-
otic. Thus in the one case the injured missionary was valued
at a seaport and vicinity; in the other he would only have been
worth an apology and a small amount of cash. Yet the law
and the justice were the same in each case.
In determining this factor of state policy, there are two
leading principles to be kept in view: One is self-interest
broadly considered; the other is the right of self-defense, which
has been called the first law of nations, as it is of individuals.
What has recently brought about the acceptance of the ces-
sion of the Philippines from Spain?
It is the belief of the Administration that the ownership of
this archipelago will be of great political and commercial ben-
efit to our country. But for this reason-a reason which
many think ill-grounded-the civilization of the islanders and
the responsibility for order would have but little weight. For
the altruism which would sacrifice or hazard the advantage of
one people in order to do good to another, while admirable in
the individual, is misplaced in managing affairs of state. It
would be the betrayal of a trust. As Judge Baldwin well says,
our Constitution makes no provision for sending missionaries.
The right of self-defense is the obverse of the principle of
self-interest. The one aims at getting a good, the other at pre-
venting an evil. It is the basis of much of the political philoso-
phy of the century. Thus the balance of power principle is
founded upon it. This means that when one of several related
states becomes so powerful by war or political means as to en-
danger the interests of the others, theymay combine foi protec-
tion, a principle older than the Christian era, yet to-day exempli-
fied in the triple alliance and the Franco-Russian extenti.
Self-defense is the foundation, too, of our owif peculiar con-
tribution to statecraft, the Monroe Doctrine. Certain South
American colonies had achieved' their independence of Spain,
their mother country, which was too weak to control them.
Then the Holy Alliance of European powers offered Spain its
help in doing this. But our government very properly said, no.
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President Monroe tells us why. "That we should consider any
attempt on [their] part to extend their system to any part of
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."
This was President Cleveland's claim in the doctrine's latest
manifestation, contained in his Venezuelan message, namely,
that England's disposition to aggression rather than arbitration,
in the matter of the boundary between Venezuela and British
Guiana, was a menace. The enforcement of the docrine, he
says, "is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is
essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tran-
quil maintenance of our distinctive form of government." And
he was entirely justified in his action, if one can discover this
danger to our institutions lurking in the control of the far
away swamps of the Guiana frontier.
Not to lose the train of thought through digression let me
repeat.
The rules of International Law are founded upon precedent.
They are added to or altered when reason and change of public
sentiment and national interest demand, but only by consent of
all civilized states can a new rule be properly incorporated into
the body of the law.
State policy is a vital factor in the framing, the interpreta-
tion, the enforcement of international rules. Our next inquiry
relates to the penalty for their violation.
When an individual violates a law, by the law he is punished.
The system of justice has within itself the power and duty of
enforcement. It is one of the defects commonly ascribed to
International Law that it has no such power. To cure this lack
as well as the kindred one of an authoritative interpreter of the
law, for generations men have been trying to devise some kind
of international court which should be able to judge a cause,
and enforce its decision.
But political society is no nearer this consummation than
when Kant inscribed his essay "1 zum ewigen Frieden," or Ben-
tham advised states to abandon their colonies. Nevertheless
there are two or three sanctions of its rules which the law of
nations provides or at least contemplates. The first is ethical.
Every state would be thought law abiding, not only because it
is right, but because it is good form. Should it violate the
law, it would be under cover of specious excuses which suffi-
ciently show its recognition of the rule and obligation to
respect it.
The second is based on the knowledge that a law or treaty
breaking power can never negotiate on as favorable terms as
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the one that keeps its word. Thus England believes that Rus-
sian faith is not to be trusted because in at least two modern
instances Russia has refused to honor her treaty obligations.
In consequence, England would be likely to require better
terms or additional guarantees in dealing with - Russia than
would otherwise suffice.
The third and chief sanction of International Law-that is,
the principle deterrent from a deliberate violation of its rules-
is war. So that war has been called the execution process of
International Law, but with this peculiarity: that the state
acts as judge in its own cause and then proceeds to execute its
own verdict.
Here, again, is apparent a painful defect. War, as a remedy,
a sanction, a legal process, is so immensely out of proportion in
cost and character to the vast majority of those wrongs which
it is appealed to to avert. Moreover, although the weak state
is the one more likely to be wronged, it is precisely the weak
state which cannot afford, from any point of view, to try such a
remedy. National pride, miscalculation of strength, false reli-
ance upon others, such reasons may lead the weak power to use
the remedy of arms, but only to find that Providence and Jus-
tice appear to be on the side of the heavier battalions.
If Spain could have made up her mind to relinquish Cuba
without a trial of strength she would have saved her other colo-
nies and we would have been spared some harrowing problems.
So much for the origin and nature of International Law, its
methods of growth, the way in which its rules are enforced,
and the defects, or rather the weaknesses, which become appar-
ent to the student. In spite of these, we may honestly say that
there exists a body of law governing the relations of states
which is fairly well agreed upon, and in accordance with which
all states pretend to conduct their intercourse. These rules
govern in part the peaceful relations of states, in part their
rights and duties in time of war. For war is still a thing to be
reckoned with, and it is in the softening and bettering of its
methods that the progress of International Law is most appar-
ent.
The characteristics of the state, and the nature and variety
of the world's political organizations; how the state acquires
territory; how it makes contracts and what they are like; the
intercourse of states and the agents who conduct this-these
are some of the major topics of that division of the subject
which relates to peace. Of all this, within my present limits, I
can give but a fragmentary idea. States are sovereign inde-
pendent and equal. What does this mean ?
3
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(i) That they can exercise in the full all the powers of gov-
ernment. If they fall short of this they are not fully sovereign
and are called accordingly semi-sovereign. Thus, to take an
example near at home, Cuba was a dependency of Spain, with
no sovereignty at all attaching to itself: then by treaty Spain
relinquished sovereignty, but did not cede it. It must there-
fore revert to the Cubans, who but for one thing would there-
fore form a new state. That one hindrance is the treaty stipu-
lation that the United States shall hold Cuba until its pacifica-
tion is accomplished. This places responsibility for the acts
of Cuba henceforth upon our shoulders; the foreign relations
are undertaken by us; the domestic government will probably
be of a character to correspond to the weight of our responsi-
bility, i. e. will be pretty completely controlled by us, though it
may be in Cuban hands. Yet no sovereignty, technically
speaking, is acquired bi the United States; it remains in abey-
ance, a de jure possession of Cuba, not to be brought out and
enjoyed defacto, however, until the United States deems pacifi-
cation completed and takes its hands off. Cuba thus halts
between dependence and independence, its present status being
a protectorate. May I digress a moment here to speak of a still
looser tie than the protectorate, namely, the sphere of influence.
It was a recent and brilliant discovery, due to the plethora of
African opportunities, that an energetic power which desired to
control uncivilized territory, or at least wished no rival to con-
trol it, yet was not ready to annex or to protect it itself, declared
the said territory to be within the sphere of its influence, and
warned all other powers to keep their hands off.
This usage reminds me of an Englishman's practice at my
hotel in Athens, where two London dailies were taken. He sat
on one until he had finished the other.
Independence, the second characteristic of the state, is just
the negative side of sovereignty, the right to be let alone; it is
an undoubted prerogative of statehood, and yet how many states
there are which are not let alone, but on the contrary are under
some form of tutelage or coercion, perhaps from the moment of
birth, as has been the fate of Greece. In theory Greece is as
much entitled to its own line of action as Russia, but in fact its
entire foreign policy may be altered at any moment by the
concert of the powers.
As independence is the rule, intervention must be the ex-
ception, needing in each case special justification, and some-
times capable of no justification at all.
We have just intervened in the relation of Spain with Cuba
on the ground of humanity and self defense.
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Three European powers prevented Japan from taking that
war indemnity from China to which it thought itself entitled.
Russia intervened between Turkey and its subject Bulgaria,
made an advantageous peace at San Stefano, but was itself held
in check by the Berlin Congress, which nullified San Stefano.
And so without mutiplying instances, we may say that the
rule is so marked by exceptions, as to be little more than a pre-
sumption.
So liberty is a right of the individual under our laws, yet the
individual may be restrained of his liberty, if criminal or insane
or a pauper or a witness; his property may be taken away by
legislation, by taxation, by eminent domain-yet liberty exists.
The third characteristic is equality.
Equality does not involve power equal to other states, or
equal commercial privilege or equal rank, but simply equality
of sovereign rights. Judged by this standard, Hawaii, with a
population not much larger than that of Hartford, and the
United States stood on even terms, and on even terms they
negotiated a union, as Texas had previously done.
The characteristics of the states are the same, but its nature
and form of government may vary widely. States are simple
or composite, like France and Austria. States are monarchical
or republican, and either may be confederated. Confederations
may place all power to enter into external relations in a cen-
tral body, or reserve much of it for the individual members.
There is no special distinction between an empire and a king-
dom. The one may become the other by simple assumption of
the coveted title, as Victoria became Empress of India a few
years since.
With the form under which a state chooses to exist, Inter-
national Law has nothing to do. It merely asks whether a cer-
tain body, aspiring to statehood, is in fact sovereign and inde-
pendent, and whether it is capable of performing its duties and
fulfilling its obligations to other states.
Think how often France has changed its form of govern-
ment in the past century. Watch the changes in Eurolie which
are imminent now. Norway and Sweden, bound to a single
sovereign under a personal union, but each with its own army
and legislature, are restless, like an uncomfortable married
couple, yet conscious of loss of dignity and strength if they
separate.
Italy, nearly bankrupt, has failed in her colonial policy, and
seems drifting to some kind of socialistic experiment. Spain
halts between Carlism and a republic.
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Great Britain, with an even mind, contemplates a closer
union with her colonies or complete separation from them, as
expediency dictates, while Russia, mighty and mysterious, is
ever contempla.ting -the likelihood of her own eventual liberal-
ization by revolution, leaving whatever form of government
one may choose to imagine in its train.
Throughout this state of flux, the international lawyer
fixes his eyes upon the one thing: the fact of a political organi-
zation in a position to claim the rights and fulfil the duties of
statehood. Just when and within what limits to recognize this"
fact, is not always easy. For when a new state is in process of
formation by its own exertions, whether by consolidation or
avulsion, by patching together or tearing apart, there is inevit-
ably a period, perhaps a long one, when the fundamental facts
are obscure. The togics here to be studied are called recogni-
tion of belligerency and of independence, the first a usual,
though not a necessary, step to the second. It was often de-
bated in Congress since the last Cuban insurrection broke out
whether or not the Cubans might be considered lawful bellig-
erents. Some even urged that Cuba should be declared inde-
pendent. But Cuba never had a political organization capable
of performing international duties, or even an army which
promised of itself to break the Spanish tie. Nor did Spain
ever cease its efforts at coercion. So that our own precedents
and the rules of International Law both forbade either kind of
recognition and left intervention as the only permissible
course.
But I must not enlarge upon any one topic, if we are to"
traverse many, and hasten to ask what a state's territory con-
sists of.
Of all the land within its bounds, of course.; of the bodies of
water entirely surrounded by such land, like the Caspian Sea or
Lake Michigan; of the mouths of its rivers, its bays and sounds
where these are not so wide as like Fundy to be properly a part
of the high seas; and of its coast sea, the water which washes
its shores, to a distance of three miles from land. Over all this
its jurisdiction extends; it also follows its ships on the high
seas, and until they enter the waters of other states. But on
its vessels of war a state's jurisdiction is not thus limited, for
obvious reasons. How completely the local law governs foreign
ships in port was shown in Charleston in slavery times. An
English ship with free blacks in her crew was loading her cargo.
There was a local rule that all masterless negroes must be jailed
at night. This rule was applied to these free English blacks,
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as well as to the wandering Charleston negroes, and there was
nothing for it but submission.
National boundaries are a fruitful source of difference.
From the treaty of 1783, which laid down the limits of the
United States, until now, there has never been a moment, I be-
lieve, when our boundaries have been unquestioned. We had a
difficulty with Great Britain over our Northeastern line, our
Northern line, our Northwestern line, and now the Alaska line
is disputed. We differed with Spain over the Louisiana line.
We made two treaties and half a dozen conventions with
Mexico over -the Mexican line. And but for the fortunate
fact that our new possessions are islands, we should find
in them material for boundary differences for generations
to come. After the Revolution the Mississippi was our west-
ern limit. Beyond that river was an unknown country. By
its discovery Spain claimed, under the title of Louisiana, a
vast region reaching as far north as the 4 9 th degree, our
present limit, and indefinitely westward. Spain ceded it to
France, and Napoleon sold it to us. Lewis and Clark ex-
plored it. Gray sailed into the mouth of the Columbia.
Astor planted a fur trading post there. Later Whitman led the
first wagon train over the mountains, and with his wheels cut
the Oregon trail, which saved the far Northwest from English
dominion. We annexed Texas. We seized New Mexico and Cal-
ifornia We bought South Arizona and Alaska. All this gave us
an unoccupied empire of contiguous territory in a temperate
climate where our own stock could labor and multiply. Now
we are assuming other and more complex problems, the solution
of which is far beyond our ken. Much of this new land the
United States has owned. Over all of it its sovereignty extends.
Our policy has been to sell, never to lease. But Texas, coming
into the Union as a sovereign state, with its own land system,
has presented another policy, and California, dotted with the
great Spanish land grants still a third. Should the Prince of
Wales buy a thousand square miles in Texas, it would be as com-
pletely subject to our jurisdiction as the spot we at this Tmoment
occupy.
In these and other ways a state acquires territory. Painfully
and slowly it defines their limits. The character of its posses-
sions is stamped upon the state. So likewise the peculiar char-
acteristics of each state are stamped upon its possessions, until,
gradually, we have a political unit, individual and separate,
which comes to mean absolutism, or liberty, the false or the
true democracy, the curse of misgovernment or the genius of
self-control, poverty or progress.
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And states of all these kinds are found in habitual inter-
course. This is the presumption of International Law. Turkey
and Persia, Germany and France, both classes alike have rela-
tions with us, political and commercial, and maintain the
agents of such intercourse. Trade is the binding tie. Non-
intercourse now-a-days is an anachronism. The first step in
relations with a new state is to make a consular convention
with it. The next is to exchange ministers. These are alike
the agents of peace. When war threatens, they are withdrawn.
The person of the ambassador is inviolable. His mission is
the maintenance of friendly relations. If he is" incapable of
helping this on, by reason of temper or prejudice, or lack of
breeding, or lack of sense, he is a failure.
With this in mind, occasionally a state will refuse to receive
a diplomatic agent in advance of his sending, because he would
be a failure if he came. Thus Austria declined to receive a Jew
nominated as minister plenipotentiary to itself, because his
race was socially obnoxious and he therefore could not carry
on his mission successfully.
A diplomatic agent is not subject to the law of the land
where he is resident, because this would hamper his work.
This exemption is called exterritoriality. In Hayti, the South
and Central American Republics, and such like countries, our
usage enlarges this right of exterritoriality considerably, so
that our minister's residence is inviolable and he may shelter
rebel leaders in it. But this excessive privilege is to be
sparingly exercised.
There are many questions of precedence and etiquette in-
volving perhaps the dignity of states, which might be men-
tioned here, but I pass to the second division of our subject,
war and the events which lead to it.
When the Golden Age shall have come, this part of our topic
will have only an historical interest. That will be a glad time.
But how shall it be reached? Some hope to gain the dizzy
mount of perpetual peace and universal brotherhood by a single
effort, by same mechanical contrivance, which shall put an end
to all war and alter the nature of mankind. But the reasonable
thinkers, even holding up the same ideal, would approach their
end gradually. Presupposing the existence of war, they would
diminish its evils as far as possible, rather than strive for an
impossible aboi And it is on this line that much progress
has been made during the present century.
The evils of war are of two kinds. They involve personal
suffering and economic waste. Wounds and death, fever and
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starvation, are still and must ever be the portion of those in
the field. But non-combatants and their rights are legislated
for, and, so far as may be, are freed from the effects of war.
Their persons are inviolable, their property can be taken only
by authority and upon payment; their local government is still
administered by the occupant authority for their benefit.
The wastefulness of war is almost too varied for calculation.
There is the burden of standing armies in anticipation of it,
which withdraw multitudes of young men for a time from pro-
ductive occupation to be instead a charge upon the state.
There is the preparation of ships of war, fortresses, toast
defenses, barracks and all kinds of military material, while
every few years much of this becomes antiquated and must be
replaced.
There is the waste of life and labor, which should be pro-
ductive, in war itself, together with tremendous expenditure
upon military engines, supplies, transportation, wages, and so
on indefinitely. Our Civil War is said to have cost $2,750,000,000.
There is also waste direct and intentional as a war measure,
coupled with waste necessary and incidental as the effect of
army movement or battle. Of this we in Connecticut have
never known much, for since the earliest Indian war, and ex-
cepting trifling British descents upon the coast during the
Revolution and war of 1812, this state has not felt the foot of
an enemy upon its soil. There are few states in the world
which have-so secure a record, and yet the sons of Connecticut
have borne an ample part in every war affecting the other colo-
nies or the united country, a shining example of altruism. And
lastly, but not finally, there is the burden of all this cost and
loss in the shape of pensions and war debt, a tax upon indus-
try weighing down generations yet unborn. Look at the finan-
cial condition of Europe to-day. Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain
and Austria are either bankrupt or crushed with taxes in the
attempt to keep above water. Russia and France are better off,
yet the Czar is proposing proportional disarmament on account
of the intolerable burden of the present military system. Ger-
many and Great Britain are the only great powers which seem
to carry their load easily. As for ourselves we are deliberately
choosing to travel the same road.
War, then, is not a cheap remedy. It always involves a wrong
attempted or committcd. It is not in accordance with the law
of love. We are forced to assume its existence, however, as we
assume that robbery and murder exist, and try to minimize its
evils.
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It is on this line perhaps that International Law has made
its greatest advance, and this in two directions, in softening
the rigors of war as felt by those who are not combatants, and
in diminishing the effect of war upon property. In this second
direction the influence of the neutral nation which dislikes to
have its natural trade interfered with, has peculiar weight.
On the one hand, persons not bearing arms, even residents
of an invaded territory, are not interfered with. The occupant
conqueror has military jurisdiction over them, but in the shape
of the local law. Undefended towns cannot be shelled. Labor
on military works cannot be forced. Food cannot be taken with-
out payment. On the other hand, public property, which does
not relate to the conduct of war, is not subject to capture.
Thus museums, churches, libraries, civic buildings and prop-
eity, are sacred. So, too, is the property of all enemies not found
on the field of battle and not consisting of military material,
except that taken on the sea. . Even this will be spared if other
powers adopt a recent proposal of our own Congress. But as
yet on the sea the old harsh rules of capture still prevail, except
that privateering is under the ban, and enemy goods are com-
monly sheltered by the neutral flag. There was a check upon
the kind of weapons allowable set by the St. Petersburg con-
vention in i868. This in no wise forbade the deadliest pos-
sible contrivances; it simply legislated against those inventions
whose utility consisted in aggravating a wound or -making re-
covery hopeless, like a poisoned bullet or an explosive of under
a pound weight.
This is supplemented by the Red Cross eutralization of aid
for the wounded which is outside of the belligerents' medical
service. The origin of the Red Cross Association is a dramatic
story.
A Swiss physician, M. Henri Dunant, wandered over the
battlefield of Solferino in 1859, and described in print what he
saw. The French army was left in possession of the field, but its
medical corps was quite unequal to the care of the wounded of
both nationalites there abandoned. The field hospitals, such as
they were, were crowded. Many of their inmates, two days after
the battle, had received no attention. Many more wounded
still lay where a shot had dropped them, living, but without
shelter or food or care. M. Dunant's story was a shock to the
civilized world. It was instrumental in starting the movement
which at Geneva, in 1863, drew up rules for the neutralization
of those persons, vehicles and buildings which should have to
do with the care of sick and wounded of either army in battle,
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marking them with a distinctive sign, and placing them under
rules. In our own country, the Red Cross Society has not con-
fined itself to the European ideal, but aids the suffering in any
great emergency, of flood, or fire, pestilence, or battle, whenever
the local agencies are unequal to the task.
It is interesting to notice what an influence upon the art of
war our Civil War has had. It first employed the breech-loader,
though not very widely. It first made effective use of armored
ships. It justified the spade as a military weapon. Our Sani-
tary Commission was a half-way precedent to the Red Cross
Societies. And Lieder's code, being general order ioo for the
government of the armies of the United States in the field, put
into shape the accepted military law of the period. Upon this
basis the later attempts to codify the laws of war have been
founded.
A chief feature of our Civil War, the weapon which more
than any other turned the scale in the North's favor, was the
blockade. This prevented the exchange of cotton for those
necessaries and military supplies which the South could not
manufacture. At first it was slack, later very efficient, although
on a vaster scale than has ever been carried out before or since.
It involved much exciting service and various difficult legal
questions. It also made profitable that organized evasion of
blockade, which runs a cargo through the patrol lines, accepting
the risk of capture. The chief feature of a legal blockade is,
that it shall not be largely on paper only, but shall be made
effective. And by this is meant, not absolute prohibition, but
great danger of capture. During the last few years of the
Napoleonic Wars, both England and France laid blockade with-
out regarding this essential. France, without a navy, declared
the British Isles under blockade; England, with an insufficient
navy, pretended to blockade the whole coast of France and its
allies, from the Elbe to the Mediterranean. Now since blockade
is a very serious limitation of the neutrals carrying trade, shut-
ting it out from its accustomed chnnnels, and since it is penal-
ized by capture of the offending ship when the breach bf block-
ade is committed, it is clearly unjust to the neutral to lay it,
when no force is at hand to make the declaration good.
In the case mentioned, the United States supported and pro-
tested but without avail, though the law was clear enough.
Since then, by usage and by agreement, it has become clearer
still, keeping pace with the growth of neutral influence, and
now no neutral state would for a moment submit to a blockade
on paper only.
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This was one of the points dealt with by the Declaration of
Paris, in 1856, which marked an epoch in the history of mari-
time warfare, abolished privateering, and enlarged the neutral
privilege in the carrying trade, but only as between the signa-
tory powers. The United States was invited to accede to this
treaty, but declined on the ground that with our small navy,
privateering was essential to the national defense. If all inno-
cent property on the sea, even belonging to belligerents, were
exempted from seizure, however, Secretary Marcy promised
this country's accession. Thus the matter has stood ever since,
most unfortunately, as it seems to me, for we need the privil-
eges of the Declaration, and as the Spanish war has proved, do
not in the least depend upon privateering to eke out our navy.
In fact, privateers are almost an obsolete article owing to the
excessive cost of a ship which can outsteam the modern mer-
chantman. Unless an official notice of the laying of a blockade is
given the neutral, he is not liable for trying to run it, for how can
he be presumed to know that it exists. There must also be a
breach of blockade, in fact or in intention, by entrance orby exit,
to warrant a ship's capture. And so we formulate the law that
there are three prerequisites to a valid capture for breach of
blockade, declaration, effectiveness and attempt at breaking.
If these are proven, the penalty falls first upon the ship as the
vehicle of offense, and next upon the cargo, unless its complicity
can be removed by evidence. In no case can the crew be pun-
ished, even with confinement, though, of course, they are subject
to the casualties which attend blockade running.
In our Civil War, Nassau was a center of blockade evasion.
Ships were specially built for it, fast, with light draught, low
free board, and no top hamper, painted a dull grey to harmonize
with sky and sea. Some of these made a round trip to Wil-
mington or Charleston monthly, and proved highly profitable,
but it was dangerous business, and nearly all came to grief
eventually. The onus of prevention rested on the shoulders of
our government, so that the trade was preventible not by Brit-
ish law, but through American capture.
The other leading topic of maritime law relates to contra-
band, i. e. to the carrying by a neutral trader to the belligerents
of such articles as relate directly to making war. Here again
the neutral government limits its duty to notice of the fact of
war, and of the penalty for carrying contraband; it does nothing
to prevent that trade, self. Moreover, as two states. may very
well disagree upon the definition of contraband, it is customary
to insert in a commercial treaty a list of articles which shall be
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so considered. Even this is not final,for the progress of a war may
introduce some new combination or invention which should fairly
be included, like armor plate for ships of war, or a new explosive.
Here the prerequisites to a valid capture are two, that the
goods shall be contraband in character and bound for a hostile
destination. In our late war with Spain, French wine shipped
to Havana would not have been c6 ntraband, nor French gun-
powder destined to St. Thomas or Hayti, because in the one
case the goods were not useful in waging war, in the other, the
destination was neutral.
The penalty for contraband trade falls first upon the goods,
but also upon the ship if she belongs to the same owner. To
enforce these two great belligerent rights, of seizing contra-
band goods and of preventing neutral trade with one's enemy
by blockade, the right to search any vessel one meets is neces-
sary. For, as the greatest of English admiralty judges, Lord
Stowell, said in a noted case: "If you cannot search every
ship, how can you tell what her character, destination and cargo
are ?" And this right of search, as a corallary to the other
rights, as essential to their existence, is as settled as anything
can be. The only question is how it shall be exercised. For it
is a most vexatious and exasperating thing even for an inno-
cent merchantman to be hove to with a shot across her bows
and have her character inquired into. Many treaties accord-
ingly prescribe minutely how this search shall be conducted,
by a single officer, for instance, with a small boat's crew and
out of gunshot of his ship.
Certain treaties even provide a substitute for the right of
search, if the suspected ship is in company of a man-of-war of
her own nationality. This is called convoy, the theory being
that the convoying ship has examined, and is answerable for,
the innocent character of all vessels in her charge.
Strictly speaking, the right of search is a war right solely.
But it is permissible in time of peace for the prevention of
smuggling and upon suspicion of piracy, though the searcher is
liable for his mistakes. The British government a century ago
claimed the right to search American vessels for runaway sea-
men and to impress them. It also occasionally tried to search
vessels suspected of being slavers without a treaty authorizing
this. Both practices were resented by our own country. And
finally search in one's own waters is lawful, and even on the
high seas in time of peace when it is a question of self defense.
Spain did this now and then in her two long contests with
Cuban insurrection to prevent the furnishing of arms and rein-
forcements to the island-and properly so.
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I have spoken repeatedly of the neutral without defining
what neutrality is, and now, though the subject is as importa4t
as any, there is space for only the briefest summary of it.
Neutrality is not giving aid impartially to friendly states
which are at war with one another. It is the abstention from
such aid while yet maintaining peaceful intercourse with them,
the one a duty, the other a right. This attitude of neutrality
will be assumed and declared when a war breaks out by those
states which are not parties to it, provided their interests are
nevertheless affected. By proclamation they announce to their
subjects their duties, to the belligerents their privileges. So
that the whole of neutrality is made up of those restrictions
upon its trade which the non-combatant state admits, and of
those duties towards the belligerents which it enjoins. Its
subjects may do what the state cannot do. The whole history
of neutrality has been a long fight between the neutral's desire
to augment his trade by carrying one's friend's goods in safety,
and the belligerent's determination to limit this.
We have now glanced at most of the leding topics of our
subject, though getting, I fear, but a muddled view of the whole
field.
Your attention has been called to the lack of certainty in
the law; to the fact that the interpretation of the victor in war
is sure to be the right one; to the confusion between policy and
justice; to the dozen other weaknesses of International Law,
as it is studied in theory or put into practice.
Nevertheless, whether we ascribe it to the self interest of
states or to their growing sense of right, each century witnesses
tremendous changes for the better. Wars are more humane;
trade is less' fettered; the freedom of the seas and the free nav-
igation of the great rivers are assured. Arbitration grows in
usefulness as a way of settling international disputes. *Big
nations still bully little ones, but on the whole in the interest of
peace. Rivalry in colonization and in trade seems to be replac-
ing the commoner and bloodier ambitions between civilized
states, while the uncivilized are fast going to the wall. We
introduce them to new wants, satisfy those wants, and force
their labor to pay the equivalent. This is the civilizing process.
A garden of Eden is no longer permissible; skins and fig leaves
have given way to calico prints; the fountains of the earth run
in irrigating ditches or transmit power.
Nevertheless slavery has nearly disappeared; famine is less
frequent; pestilence not so widespread; law and order reign
more widely, and the nations which don't want to fight have the
whip hand of those which do. THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.
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